AI Camera Security
AI video analytics that detects incidents, intrusions and safety risks in real time — on a SAVIS AI camera line with a hardware root of trust, designed for IEC 62443 and ETSI EN 303 645.
What AI Camera Security does
AI video analytics that detects incidents, intrusions and safety risks in real time — on a SAVIS AI camera line with a hardware root of trust, designed for IEC 62443 and ETSI EN 303 645. Delivered by SAVIS with consulting, integration and managed operations.
SAVIS-led solution.
Five models, two shared platforms, one security core
A trusted, sovereign AI camera line for critical infrastructure and smart cities: Western-grade cybersecurity certification as the target, keys that never leave the device, and source-code options for government buyers. Platform A powers the dome, bullet and LPR models; Platform B powers the multisensor and PTZ models. All five share the same secure firmware, secure element and software stack.
Concept · in development
Dome AI 4MP
Indoor and outdoor perimeters, lobbies, corridors
- 4MP @ 60 fps
- ~6 TOPS NPU
- IR 40 m
- 12 W
Bullet AI 8MP
Streets, car parks, fences and long perimeters
- 4K @ 30 fps
- ~6 TOPS NPU
- IR 80 m
- 15 W
LPR / ANPR
Gates, toll points, tunnels and traffic enforcement
- Global shutter
- Plate, make, colour
- IR 850 + 940 nm
- 22 W
Multisensor 16MP
Intersections, squares and wide open areas
- 4 × 4MP sensors
- ~12 TOPS NPU
- Cross-channel tracking
- 45 W
PTZ AI
City surveillance, ports, borders and critical sites
- 40× optical zoom
- ~12 TOPS NPU
- IR laser 400 m
- 85 W
Editions
Global edition
Full EU and US certification set for international tenders.
Gov edition
IEC 62443-4-2 SL3, customer-held root of trust, all cloud connections disabled.
Lite edition
Without the FIPS secure element, for commercial projects in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
Target specification by model
| Specification | SX-D4 Dome AI 4MP | SX-B8 Bullet AI 8MP | SX-L4 LPR / ANPR | SX-M16 Multisensor 16MP | SX-P4 PTZ AI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform | A | A | A | B | B |
| NPU (AI performance) | ~6 TOPS | ~6 TOPS | ~6 TOPS | ~12 TOPS | ~12 TOPS |
| Image sensor | 1/1.8" 4MP, starlight | 1/1.2" 8MP, starlight | 1/1.8" 4MP global shutter | 4 × 1/1.8" 4MP | 1/1.8" 4MP, starlight |
| Resolution / frame rate | 2688×1520 @ 60 fps | 3840×2160 @ 30 fps | 2048×1536 @ 60 fps | 4 × 2688×1520 @ 30 fps | 2688×1520 @ 60 fps |
| Lens | 2.8–12 mm motorised | 4–16 mm motorised, P-Iris | 10–50 mm motorised | 4 × 2.8–8 mm motorised, independent tilt | 6.5–260 mm, 40× optical zoom |
| WDR | 140 dB | 140 dB | 120 dB + headlight compensation | 120 dB | 140 dB |
| Illumination | IR 40 m | IR 80 m | IR 850 nm + 940 nm 40 m, synced flash | IR 30 m per channel | IR laser 400 m |
| AI analytics | Person / vehicle classification, line crossing, loitering, people counting | As D4 + attribute search, crowd detection | Multi-country plate reading, make / colour, average speed | Cross-channel tracking, heat maps | AI auto-tracking, AI-driven PTZ control |
| Video encoding | H.265 / H.264 / MJPEG | H.265 / H.264 / MJPEG | H.265 / H.264 / MJPEG | H.265 / H.264 | H.265 / H.264 / MJPEG |
| Streams | 3 + metadata | 3 + metadata | 3 + metadata | 2 per channel + metadata | 3 + metadata |
| Hardware security | Secure element CC EAL6+ (FIPS 140-3 module), secure boot, IEEE 802.1AR IDevID, tamper sensor | As D4 | As D4 | As D4 | As D4 |
| Network / power | PoE 802.3at, 1 GbE | PoE 802.3at, 1 GbE | PoE+ 802.3at or 24 VAC, 1 GbE | PoE++ 802.3bt, 1 GbE SFP | Hi-PoE 90 W or 24 VAC, 1 GbE SFP |
| Edge storage | microSD 512 GB, encrypted | microSD 512 GB, encrypted | microSD 1 TB, encrypted | microSD 1 TB, encrypted | microSD 1 TB, encrypted |
| I/O | 1 in / 1 out, two-way audio | 2 in / 1 out, audio | 2 in / 2 out, RS-485 | 2 in / 2 out | 4 in / 2 out, audio |
| Protection | IP67, IK10 | IP67, IK10, NEMA 4X | IP67, IK10 | IP67, IK10 | IP67, IK10, C5-M corrosion |
| Operating temperature | −40 °C to +60 °C | −40 °C to +60 °C | −40 °C to +65 °C | −40 °C to +55 °C | −40 °C to +65 °C |
| Dimensions | Ø150 × 115 mm | 290 × 105 × 100 mm | 340 × 120 × 115 mm | Ø260 × 120 mm | Ø240 × 380 mm |
| Weight | 0.9 kg | 1.6 kg | 2.2 kg | 4.5 kg | 7.5 kg |
| Max. power | 12 W | 15 W | 22 W | 45 W | 85 W |
| Target certifications | IEC 62443-4-2 SL2, ETSI EN 303 645, ONVIF S/G/T/M, NDAA, CE/FCC/UKCA | As D4 | As D4 + national LPR standard | As D4 | As D4 + IEC 62443-4-2 SL3 (Gov edition) |
Target values for the concept-design phase. SoC, NPU and sensor are reference configurations to be finalised after evaluation boards and supplier quotations. All specifications are subject to change.
Built for outdoor duty and physical attack
Housing
Die-cast ADC12 aluminium, UV-resistant polyester powder coat; 316 stainless tamper-proof Torx screws
Sealing
Double silicone gasket, ePTFE membrane vent against condensation
Thermal
Core module bonded to the aluminium body through a thermal pad; fanless
Anti-tamper
Case switch and accelerometer wired to the secure element; SE and flash potted in epoxy; no exposed debug ports
Mounting
4" junction box, wall, pole and corner brackets compatible across all five models
Every model uses the same 60 × 60 mm core module — SoC, memory and secure element under shielding. Models differ only in housing, optics and power, which shortens tooling and re-certification.
- IDevID / LDevID private keys generated in the secure element — never exported
- Boot ROM verifies ECDSA P-384 signatures twice (anti-glitch)
- eFuse holds the root public key and anti-rollback counter
- JTAG / UART locked by eFuse; reopened only by signed per-device challenge-response
- Flash encrypted with AES-256-XTS; key held in the SE
- Separate power filtering for the SE to reduce power leakage (DPA)
- Case opened → session keys erased, alert sent to the SOC
- Shared 60 × 60 mm secure core module, section A–A (common to all five models). Concept design; vertical scale exaggerated.
Concept drawings to guide R&D, not for production. Production drawings will be produced in CAD after optics and thermal design are frozen.
Mechanical specifications
| Mechanical | SX-D4 | SX-B8 | SX-L4 | SX-M1 6 | SX-P4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Form factor | Vandal-resistant dome | Bullet with sunshield | LPR bullet, long hood | 4-sensor dome, round base | Pendant PTZ, cylindrical body |
| Housing | ADC12 aluminium + 3 mm PC dome | ADC12 aluminium | ADC12 aluminium | ADC12 aluminium + 3 mm PC dome | ADC12 aluminium + optical acrylic dome |
| Window | Scratch-resistant PC dome | Tempered glass, hydrophobic coating | Tempered glass, IR filter | Scratch-resistant PC dome | Acrylic dome with wiper |
| Mounting | Ceiling, wall, 4" junction box | Wall, pole, corner | Pole, gantry | Ceiling, wall, pole | Wall, pole, parapet |
| Ports | Sealed RJ45, I/O | Sealed RJ45, I/O | RJ45, RS-485, I/O, 24 VAC | SFP / RJ45, I/O | SFP, 24 VAC, I/O |
| Cooling | Passive through base | Passive through body | Passive through body | Passive, finned base | Passive + heater |
Mounting: 4" junction box, wall, pole and corner brackets compatible across all five models
Five layers of defence, rooted in the camera’s secure element
The device’s secret keys never leave the secure element, firmware cannot be replaced or downgraded, and a fake or tampered camera cannot join the network. Each layer must hold even if the one next to it has been breached.
Management & audit
- PAM with FIDO2 keys and four-eyes control for video export and firmware updates
- SIEM / UEBA; audit logs on Object Lock (WORM) storage
Centre & applications
- Active-active NGFW, ZTNA for remote access, mTLS between VMS and cameras
- Private PKI: offline Root CA in HSM; Issuing CA enrols LDevID via EST
Wide-area network
- WAN-MACsec AES-GCM-256 over dedicated fibre or L2 EVPN
- IPsec AES-256-GCM on SD-WAN backup paths; isolated from the Internet
Access network
- 802.1X EAP-TLS with device certificates; Private VLAN / port isolation
- DHCP snooping, DAI, IP Source Guard; unknown devices to quarantine VLAN
Edge device · root of trust
- Secure element CC EAL6+, secure boot, anti-rollback, remote attestation
- Debug locked by eFuse, encrypted flash, tamper sensor alerts to SOC
Each layer checks the identity issued at layer 1. Breaching one layer does not open the next. Reference: IEC 62443, ETSI EN 303 645.
Threats and countermeasures
| Threat | Countermeasure | Standard / mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Fake or cloned camera plugged into the network | Each camera carries a factory-PKI IDevID; private key generated and stored in the secure element, non-exportable | IEEE 802.1AR, EAP-TLS (802.1X) |
| Device ownership hijacked at handover | Ownership transfer by signed voucher; customer issues LDevID from its own CA | BRSKI (RFC 8995), EST (RFC 7030) |
| Modified firmware | Secure boot with a chain of trust from ROM; every stage signed with ECDSA P-384 / SHA-384 | Root public key fused in eFuse |
| Downgrade to vulnerable firmware | Anti-rollback counter in eFuse or secure element | A/B partitions, atomic updates |
| Hardware swapped on an enrolled device | Remote attestation: the camera signs boot measurements, the server verifies them | DICE (TCG), measurement reports |
| Supply-chain tampering | Key injection on the production line with HSMs, logged per serial number; tamper-evident packaging | IEC 62443-4-1, ISO/IEC 20243 |
Side-channel and physical attacks
| Attack | On-chip countermeasure | Board and enclosure countermeasure |
|---|---|---|
| Power / EM analysis (SPA, DPA, EMA) | Secure element CC EAL6+ with AVA_VAN.5; constant-time crypto with masking and shuffling | SE under its own metal shield; separate power filtering |
| Fault injection (voltage, clock, laser, EM glitch) | Voltage, frequency and light sensors in the SE; double signature checks in boot ROM; skip-resistant control flow | On-board voltage monitoring; reset when thresholds are exceeded |
| Timing attacks | Constant-time crypto library; TLS 1.3 without timing-vulnerable ciphers | Tested to ISO/IEC 17825 (TVLA) |
| Debug port access (JTAG, UART, SWD) | Debug locked by eFuse; reopened only by signed per-device challenge-response | No exposed test points; SE and flash potted |
| Direct flash read-out | Partition encryption (AES-256-XTS) with keys in the SE | Flash and SE placed together under a protective layer |
| Opening or removing the device | Tamper sensor reports to the SE | Case switch + accelerometer: session keys erased, SOC alerted |
Tamper response erases session keys and local data-encryption keys — not the IDevID — so a false alarm from wind or vibration never bricks a camera. The response level is configurable per site.
- TLS 1.3 by default; TLS 1.2 with ECDHE + AES-GCM only for third-party devices; TLS 1.0 / 1.1 disabled
- mTLS for management, PTZ control, metadata and RTSPS streams; OCSP stapling with CRL fallback
- ECDSA P-384 PKI; roadmap to post-quantum signed firmware (ML-DSA, ML-KEM — FIPS 204 / 203) from 2028
- Telnet, UPnP, cloud P2P and unencrypted protocols off by default; no default accounts or passwords (ETSI EN 303 645, 5.1)
- PAM with FIDO2 hardware keys and four-eyes control for video export, bulk configuration and firmware updates
- UEBA on the SIEM flags mass camera re-pointing, unusual exports and out-of-shift actions
- Audit logs streamed to SIEM and stored on Object Lock (compliance mode)
- Evidence video exported to WORM storage, digitally signed and timestamped
- PSIRT with a public vulnerability disclosure policy and CVE assignment (CNA)
- SBOM (SPDX or CycloneDX) for every firmware release, with continuous library scanning
- Security patches for at least 7 years after the last batch is sold, in line with the EU CRA
- Independent penetration testing every year and before every major release
For city-scale and critical-infrastructure networks
Encrypted unicast video
No multicast across the WAN. Cameras send encrypted unicast streams (RTSPS / SRTP) to the recording cluster; operators view through the VMS proxy.
Camera isolation
Private VLAN or port isolation on access switches — not Layer-3 ACLs — so cameras cannot reach each other.
Access-port protection
DHCP snooping, Dynamic ARP Inspection, IP Source Guard and BPDU guard on every camera port.
Trusted time
PTP (IEEE 1588) in the core and NTS (RFC 8915) to cameras. Accurate timestamps make video admissible as evidence.
Resilient paths
Two independent uplinks per site: if the primary ring fails, traffic moves to SD-WAN and stays encrypted.
Site power & cabinet
30–60 min UPS, cabinet temperature monitoring and door sensors reported to the SIEM.
Standards we design and certify against
| Standard / regulation | Scope | Status |
|---|---|---|
| IEC 62443-4-1 | Secure development lifecycle | Target · first, foundation for 4-2 and CRA |
| IEC 62443-4-2 SL2 / SL3 | Technical security requirements per component | Target · SL2 all models, SL3 Gov edition |
| ETSI EN 303 645 | 13 IoT security provisions (EU, UK, Singapore) | Target |
| EN 18031-1/-2/-3 | EU RED Art. 3.3 (d)(e)(f) for radio models | Target (radio variants) |
| EU Cyber Resilience Act | SBOM, vulnerability handling, incident reporting, lifetime patching | Designed in · main obligations from 12/2027 |
| NIS 2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) | Operator obligations; Art. 21 supply-chain security | Supported for EU customers |
| NDAA §889 | No components from designated vendors | Target · component-level origin control |
| FIPS 140-3 | Cryptographic module | Via certified secure element |
| UL 2900-2-3 | Cybersecurity for physical security devices (North America) | Target |
| ONVIF Profile S / G / T / M | VMS interoperability | Target |
| IEC 60529 / IEC 62262 / IEC 60068 | IP66/67, IK10, vibration and temperature | Target |
| CE / FCC / UKCA / RCM / KC | EMC, electrical safety, radio | Target |
- Law on Cybersecurity 2018 and Law on Network Information Security 2015
- Information-system security by level (Decree 85/2016/ND-CP and successor texts); city camera systems are typically level 3–4
- TCVN 11930:2017 — baseline requirements by security level
- Law on Bidding 2023 — functional criteria, not brand names
- National technical regulation for IP surveillance cameras — check the version in force
Supply-chain sovereignty is now a pass/fail criterion in government tenders, and the EU RED Delegated Act, CRA and NIS 2 make cybersecurity a condition of sale. The SAVIS AI camera line is designed to these rules from the first line of code.
Four levels of openness — including source code
Level 1 · Standard
Signed firmware, full API and SDK, SBOM and penetration-test report.
Level 2 · Custom
Features on request; SAVIS develops and maintains a dedicated firmware branch.
Level 3 · Source-code escrow
Source code held by an independent escrow agent and released to the customer if support ends.
Level 4 · Technology transfer
Source of SAVIS-developed software, build environment, signing process and training. The customer holds the firmware signing keys.
- Reproducible builds let customers verify that the binary matches the delivered source. Level 4 is designed for government and defence customers.
Smart city operations
See the city
Live map of cameras, sensors and incidents.
AI detects
AI Camera flags an accident or crowding.
Dispatch
Assign teams and notify citizens.
Devices protected
Every camera and sensor authenticated with certificates.
Report
Response times and trends for planners.
Where AI Camera Security fits
- Operations centre
- Citizen app
- IoT gateway
- Video management
- Smart City platform
- AI Camera analytics
- Device PKI
- Secure boot & updates
- Traffic, utility & emergency systems
Logical architecture: layers and the SAVIS components in each.
Applied in
Smart city operations
One operations centre for cameras, sensors and incidents.
- See the city
- AI detects
- Dispatch
- Devices protected
Run it your way
On-premises
Installed in your data centre, under your control.
Private cloud
Deployed in your cloud tenancy or a national cloud.
Managed service
Operated 24/7 by SAVIS under agreed SLAs.
Integration
APIs, SDKs and connectors for your core systems.
Available deployment models vary by product.
Used in
- Transport & Logistics
- Education

