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03 · Smart City

AI Camera Security

AI video analytics that detects incidents, intrusions and safety risks in real time — on a SAVIS AI camera line with a hardware root of trust, designed for IEC 62443 and ETSI EN 303 645.

Overview

What AI Camera Security does

AI video analytics that detects incidents, intrusions and safety risks in real time — on a SAVIS AI camera line with a hardware root of trust, designed for IEC 62443 and ETSI EN 303 645. Delivered by SAVIS with consulting, integration and managed operations.

Product master record

SAVIS-led solution.

Product family

Five models, two shared platforms, one security core

A trusted, sovereign AI camera line for critical infrastructure and smart cities: Western-grade cybersecurity certification as the target, keys that never leave the device, and source-code options for government buyers. Platform A powers the dome, bullet and LPR models; Platform B powers the multisensor and PTZ models. All five share the same secure firmware, secure element and software stack.

Concept · in development

SX-D4

Dome AI 4MP

Indoor and outdoor perimeters, lobbies, corridors

  • 4MP @ 60 fps
  • ~6 TOPS NPU
  • IR 40 m
  • 12 W
SX-B8

Bullet AI 8MP

Streets, car parks, fences and long perimeters

  • 4K @ 30 fps
  • ~6 TOPS NPU
  • IR 80 m
  • 15 W
SX-L4

LPR / ANPR

Gates, toll points, tunnels and traffic enforcement

  • Global shutter
  • Plate, make, colour
  • IR 850 + 940 nm
  • 22 W
SX-M16

Multisensor 16MP

Intersections, squares and wide open areas

  • 4 × 4MP sensors
  • ~12 TOPS NPU
  • Cross-channel tracking
  • 45 W
SX-P4

PTZ AI

City surveillance, ports, borders and critical sites

  • 40× optical zoom
  • ~12 TOPS NPU
  • IR laser 400 m
  • 85 W

Editions

Global edition

Full EU and US certification set for international tenders.

Gov edition

IEC 62443-4-2 SL3, customer-held root of trust, all cloud connections disabled.

Lite edition

Without the FIPS secure element, for commercial projects in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Technical specifications

Target specification by model

SpecificationSX-D4 Dome AI 4MPSX-B8 Bullet AI 8MPSX-L4 LPR / ANPRSX-M16 Multisensor 16MPSX-P4 PTZ AI
PlatformAAABB
NPU (AI performance)~6 TOPS~6 TOPS~6 TOPS~12 TOPS~12 TOPS
Image sensor1/1.8" 4MP, starlight1/1.2" 8MP, starlight1/1.8" 4MP global shutter4 × 1/1.8" 4MP1/1.8" 4MP, starlight
Resolution / frame rate2688×1520 @ 60 fps3840×2160 @ 30 fps2048×1536 @ 60 fps4 × 2688×1520 @ 30 fps2688×1520 @ 60 fps
Lens2.8–12 mm motorised4–16 mm motorised, P-Iris10–50 mm motorised4 × 2.8–8 mm motorised, independent tilt6.5–260 mm, 40× optical zoom
WDR140 dB140 dB120 dB + headlight compensation120 dB140 dB
IlluminationIR 40 mIR 80 mIR 850 nm + 940 nm 40 m, synced flashIR 30 m per channelIR laser 400 m
AI analyticsPerson / vehicle classification, line crossing, loitering, people countingAs D4 + attribute search, crowd detectionMulti-country plate reading, make / colour, average speedCross-channel tracking, heat mapsAI auto-tracking, AI-driven PTZ control
Video encodingH.265 / H.264 / MJPEGH.265 / H.264 / MJPEGH.265 / H.264 / MJPEGH.265 / H.264H.265 / H.264 / MJPEG
Streams3 + metadata3 + metadata3 + metadata2 per channel + metadata3 + metadata
Hardware securitySecure element CC EAL6+ (FIPS 140-3 module), secure boot, IEEE 802.1AR IDevID, tamper sensorAs D4As D4As D4As D4
Network / powerPoE 802.3at, 1 GbEPoE 802.3at, 1 GbEPoE+ 802.3at or 24 VAC, 1 GbEPoE++ 802.3bt, 1 GbE SFPHi-PoE 90 W or 24 VAC, 1 GbE SFP
Edge storagemicroSD 512 GB, encryptedmicroSD 512 GB, encryptedmicroSD 1 TB, encryptedmicroSD 1 TB, encryptedmicroSD 1 TB, encrypted
I/O1 in / 1 out, two-way audio2 in / 1 out, audio2 in / 2 out, RS-4852 in / 2 out4 in / 2 out, audio
ProtectionIP67, IK10IP67, IK10, NEMA 4XIP67, IK10IP67, IK10IP67, IK10, C5-M corrosion
Operating temperature−40 °C to +60 °C−40 °C to +60 °C−40 °C to +65 °C−40 °C to +55 °C−40 °C to +65 °C
DimensionsØ150 × 115 mm290 × 105 × 100 mm340 × 120 × 115 mmØ260 × 120 mmØ240 × 380 mm
Weight0.9 kg1.6 kg2.2 kg4.5 kg7.5 kg
Max. power12 W15 W22 W45 W85 W
Target certificationsIEC 62443-4-2 SL2, ETSI EN 303 645, ONVIF S/G/T/M, NDAA, CE/FCC/UKCAAs D4As D4 + national LPR standardAs D4As D4 + IEC 62443-4-2 SL3 (Gov edition)

Target values for the concept-design phase. SoC, NPU and sensor are reference configurations to be finalised after evaluation boards and supplier quotations. All specifications are subject to change.

Industrial design

Built for outdoor duty and physical attack

Housing

Die-cast ADC12 aluminium, UV-resistant polyester powder coat; 316 stainless tamper-proof Torx screws

Sealing

Double silicone gasket, ePTFE membrane vent against condensation

Thermal

Core module bonded to the aluminium body through a thermal pad; fanless

Anti-tamper

Case switch and accelerometer wired to the secure element; SE and flash potted in epoxy; no exposed debug ports

Mounting

4" junction box, wall, pole and corner brackets compatible across all five models

One core, five housings

Every model uses the same 60 × 60 mm core module — SoC, memory and secure element under shielding. Models differ only in housing, optics and power, which shortens tooling and re-certification.

  • IDevID / LDevID private keys generated in the secure element — never exported
  • Boot ROM verifies ECDSA P-384 signatures twice (anti-glitch)
  • eFuse holds the root public key and anti-rollback counter
  • JTAG / UART locked by eFuse; reopened only by signed per-device challenge-response
  • Flash encrypted with AES-256-XTS; key held in the SE
  • Separate power filtering for the SE to reduce power leakage (DPA)
  • Case opened → session keys erased, alert sent to the SOC
  • Shared 60 × 60 mm secure core module, section A–A (common to all five models). Concept design; vertical scale exaggerated.

Concept drawings to guide R&D, not for production. Production drawings will be produced in CAD after optics and thermal design are frozen.

Mechanical specifications

MechanicalSX-D4SX-B8SX-L4SX-M1 6SX-P4
Form factorVandal-resistant domeBullet with sunshieldLPR bullet, long hood4-sensor dome, round basePendant PTZ, cylindrical body
HousingADC12 aluminium + 3 mm PC domeADC12 aluminiumADC12 aluminiumADC12 aluminium + 3 mm PC domeADC12 aluminium + optical acrylic dome
WindowScratch-resistant PC domeTempered glass, hydrophobic coatingTempered glass, IR filterScratch-resistant PC domeAcrylic dome with wiper
MountingCeiling, wall, 4" junction boxWall, pole, cornerPole, gantryCeiling, wall, poleWall, pole, parapet
PortsSealed RJ45, I/OSealed RJ45, I/ORJ45, RS-485, I/O, 24 VACSFP / RJ45, I/OSFP, 24 VAC, I/O
CoolingPassive through basePassive through bodyPassive through bodyPassive, finned basePassive + heater

Mounting: 4" junction box, wall, pole and corner brackets compatible across all five models

Security architecture

Five layers of defence, rooted in the camera’s secure element

The device’s secret keys never leave the secure element, firmware cannot be replaced or downgraded, and a fake or tampered camera cannot join the network. Each layer must hold even if the one next to it has been breached.

Layer 5

Management & audit

  • PAM with FIDO2 keys and four-eyes control for video export and firmware updates
  • SIEM / UEBA; audit logs on Object Lock (WORM) storage
Layer 4

Centre & applications

  • Active-active NGFW, ZTNA for remote access, mTLS between VMS and cameras
  • Private PKI: offline Root CA in HSM; Issuing CA enrols LDevID via EST
Layer 3

Wide-area network

  • WAN-MACsec AES-GCM-256 over dedicated fibre or L2 EVPN
  • IPsec AES-256-GCM on SD-WAN backup paths; isolated from the Internet
Layer 2

Access network

  • 802.1X EAP-TLS with device certificates; Private VLAN / port isolation
  • DHCP snooping, DAI, IP Source Guard; unknown devices to quarantine VLAN
Layer 1

Edge device · root of trust

  • Secure element CC EAL6+, secure boot, anti-rollback, remote attestation
  • Debug locked by eFuse, encrypted flash, tamper sensor alerts to SOC

Each layer checks the identity issued at layer 1. Breaching one layer does not open the next. Reference: IEC 62443, ETSI EN 303 645.

Anti-cloning & device integrity

Threats and countermeasures

ThreatCountermeasureStandard / mechanism
Fake or cloned camera plugged into the networkEach camera carries a factory-PKI IDevID; private key generated and stored in the secure element, non-exportableIEEE 802.1AR, EAP-TLS (802.1X)
Device ownership hijacked at handoverOwnership transfer by signed voucher; customer issues LDevID from its own CABRSKI (RFC 8995), EST (RFC 7030)
Modified firmwareSecure boot with a chain of trust from ROM; every stage signed with ECDSA P-384 / SHA-384Root public key fused in eFuse
Downgrade to vulnerable firmwareAnti-rollback counter in eFuse or secure elementA/B partitions, atomic updates
Hardware swapped on an enrolled deviceRemote attestation: the camera signs boot measurements, the server verifies themDICE (TCG), measurement reports
Supply-chain tamperingKey injection on the production line with HSMs, logged per serial number; tamper-evident packagingIEC 62443-4-1, ISO/IEC 20243

Side-channel and physical attacks

AttackOn-chip countermeasureBoard and enclosure countermeasure
Power / EM analysis (SPA, DPA, EMA)Secure element CC EAL6+ with AVA_VAN.5; constant-time crypto with masking and shufflingSE under its own metal shield; separate power filtering
Fault injection (voltage, clock, laser, EM glitch)Voltage, frequency and light sensors in the SE; double signature checks in boot ROM; skip-resistant control flowOn-board voltage monitoring; reset when thresholds are exceeded
Timing attacksConstant-time crypto library; TLS 1.3 without timing-vulnerable ciphersTested to ISO/IEC 17825 (TVLA)
Debug port access (JTAG, UART, SWD)Debug locked by eFuse; reopened only by signed per-device challenge-responseNo exposed test points; SE and flash potted
Direct flash read-outPartition encryption (AES-256-XTS) with keys in the SEFlash and SE placed together under a protective layer
Opening or removing the deviceTamper sensor reports to the SECase switch + accelerometer: session keys erased, SOC alerted

Tamper response erases session keys and local data-encryption keys — not the IDevID — so a false alarm from wind or vibration never bricks a camera. The response level is configurable per site.

Connection & application
  • TLS 1.3 by default; TLS 1.2 with ECDHE + AES-GCM only for third-party devices; TLS 1.0 / 1.1 disabled
  • mTLS for management, PTZ control, metadata and RTSPS streams; OCSP stapling with CRL fallback
  • ECDSA P-384 PKI; roadmap to post-quantum signed firmware (ML-DSA, ML-KEM — FIPS 204 / 203) from 2028
  • Telnet, UPnP, cloud P2P and unencrypted protocols off by default; no default accounts or passwords (ETSI EN 303 645, 5.1)
Insider threats
  • PAM with FIDO2 hardware keys and four-eyes control for video export, bulk configuration and firmware updates
  • UEBA on the SIEM flags mass camera re-pointing, unusual exports and out-of-shift actions
  • Audit logs streamed to SIEM and stored on Object Lock (compliance mode)
  • Evidence video exported to WORM storage, digitally signed and timestamped
Product security operations
  • PSIRT with a public vulnerability disclosure policy and CVE assignment (CNA)
  • SBOM (SPDX or CycloneDX) for every firmware release, with continuous library scanning
  • Security patches for at least 7 years after the last batch is sold, in line with the EU CRA
  • Independent penetration testing every year and before every major release
Deployment design rules

For city-scale and critical-infrastructure networks

Encrypted unicast video

No multicast across the WAN. Cameras send encrypted unicast streams (RTSPS / SRTP) to the recording cluster; operators view through the VMS proxy.

Camera isolation

Private VLAN or port isolation on access switches — not Layer-3 ACLs — so cameras cannot reach each other.

Access-port protection

DHCP snooping, Dynamic ARP Inspection, IP Source Guard and BPDU guard on every camera port.

Trusted time

PTP (IEEE 1588) in the core and NTS (RFC 8915) to cameras. Accurate timestamps make video admissible as evidence.

Resilient paths

Two independent uplinks per site: if the primary ring fails, traffic moves to SD-WAN and stays encrypted.

Site power & cabinet

30–60 min UPS, cabinet temperature monitoring and door sensors reported to the SIEM.

Compliance & certification

Standards we design and certify against

Standard / regulationScopeStatus
IEC 62443-4-1Secure development lifecycleTarget · first, foundation for 4-2 and CRA
IEC 62443-4-2 SL2 / SL3Technical security requirements per componentTarget · SL2 all models, SL3 Gov edition
ETSI EN 303 64513 IoT security provisions (EU, UK, Singapore)Target
EN 18031-1/-2/-3EU RED Art. 3.3 (d)(e)(f) for radio modelsTarget (radio variants)
EU Cyber Resilience ActSBOM, vulnerability handling, incident reporting, lifetime patchingDesigned in · main obligations from 12/2027
NIS 2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555)Operator obligations; Art. 21 supply-chain securitySupported for EU customers
NDAA §889No components from designated vendorsTarget · component-level origin control
FIPS 140-3Cryptographic moduleVia certified secure element
UL 2900-2-3Cybersecurity for physical security devices (North America)Target
ONVIF Profile S / G / T / MVMS interoperabilityTarget
IEC 60529 / IEC 62262 / IEC 60068IP66/67, IK10, vibration and temperatureTarget
CE / FCC / UKCA / RCM / KCEMC, electrical safety, radioTarget
Vietnam legal basis
  • Law on Cybersecurity 2018 and Law on Network Information Security 2015
  • Information-system security by level (Decree 85/2016/ND-CP and successor texts); city camera systems are typically level 3–4
  • TCVN 11930:2017 — baseline requirements by security level
  • Law on Bidding 2023 — functional criteria, not brand names
  • National technical regulation for IP surveillance cameras — check the version in force
Why it matters

Supply-chain sovereignty is now a pass/fail criterion in government tenders, and the EU RED Delegated Act, CRA and NIS 2 make cybersecurity a condition of sale. The SAVIS AI camera line is designed to these rules from the first line of code.

Sovereign delivery

Four levels of openness — including source code

Level 1 · Standard

Signed firmware, full API and SDK, SBOM and penetration-test report.

Level 2 · Custom

Features on request; SAVIS develops and maintains a dedicated firmware branch.

Level 3 · Source-code escrow

Source code held by an independent escrow agent and released to the customer if support ends.

Level 4 · Technology transfer

Source of SAVIS-developed software, build environment, signing process and training. The customer holds the firmware signing keys.

  • Reproducible builds let customers verify that the binary matches the delivered source. Level 4 is designed for government and defence customers.
How it works

Smart city operations

01

See the city

Live map of cameras, sensors and incidents.

02

AI detects

AI Camera flags an accident or crowding.

03

Dispatch

Assign teams and notify citizens.

04

Devices protected

Every camera and sensor authenticated with certificates.

05

Report

Response times and trends for planners.

Logical architecture

Where AI Camera Security fits

Channels
  • Operations centre
  • Citizen app
Access & API
  • IoT gateway
  • Video management
SAVIS services
  • Smart City platform
  • AI Camera analytics
Trust & crypto core
  • Device PKI
  • Secure boot & updates
Enterprise systems
  • Traffic, utility & emergency systems

Logical architecture: layers and the SAVIS components in each.

Use cases

Applied in

03 · Digital Government & Smart Infrastructure

Smart city operations

One operations centre for cameras, sensors and incidents.

  1. See the city
  2. AI detects
  3. Dispatch
  4. Devices protected
Deployment & delivery

Run it your way

On-premises

Installed in your data centre, under your control.

Private cloud

Deployed in your cloud tenancy or a national cloud.

Managed service

Operated 24/7 by SAVIS under agreed SLAs.

Integration

APIs, SDKs and connectors for your core systems.

Available deployment models vary by product.

Industries

Used in

  • Transport & Logistics
  • Education